tiếp tục:
Theo Pentagon Papers ngày 23/6/54, Chu Ân Lai đi đêm với Mendès-France, sau khi các ngoại trưởng Anh, Mỹ, Liên Sô đều về nước sau khi vấn đề Triều Tiên không thành ngày 19/6/54. Chu Ân Lai yêu cầu Pháp đừng để Mỹ lập căn cứ tại Đông Dương và đoan hứa sẽ khiến VM bàn thảo nghiêm chỉnh về ngưng bắn.
In an important encounter at Bern on June 23, Chou En-lai several times emphasized to Mendès-France that the main thing was a cease-fire, on which he hoped progress could be made before all the heads of delegation returned to Geneva. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, Chou thought regroupment areas for the insurgents would be necessary, but reiterated that national unity was the affair of the royal governments; he hoped the resistance elements might find a place in the national life of their respective countries. Chou told the French premier, as he had told Eden previously, that no American bases could be permitted in those countries; yet Chou spoke sympathetically of the French Union. Turning finally to the Viet Minh, Chou urged that direct contact be established between them and the Vietnamese. He promised that for his part, he would see that the Viet Minh were thoroughly prepared for serious discussions on a military settlement. Clearly, the Chinese were far more interested in moving forward toward a cease-fire than were their Viet Minh counterparts.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent8.htm Theo Pentagon Papers sau buổi họp giữa Chu Ân Lai và Hồ Chí Minh tại Nanning - thật ra thì là ở Liuzhou, theo tài liệu mật TC - từ ngày 3 đến 5 tháng 7 năm 1954, VM miễn cưỡng phải nghe theo TC áp dụng chiến thuật hòa hoãn chứ không gây hấn tại hội nghị Geneva.
Chou''''s diplomatic efforts took a different turn, it seems, when he met with Ho Chi Minh at Nanning, on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, from July 3-5. Although the final communique merely stated that the two leaders "had a full exchange of views on the Geneva Conference with respect to the question of the restoration of peace in Indochina and related questions," it subsequently appeared that much more may have taken place. According to observers in Hong Kong, Chou pressed for the meeting out of fear that the Viet Minh might engage in intensified military action that would destroy chances for an armistice and upset China''''s budding role as an Asian peacemaker. Conceivably, Chou sought to persuade Ho that his territorial gains were about as much as he could expect at that juncture without risking an end to negotiations and renewed American attempts to forge a military alliance for intervention. To judge from the Viet Minh reaction to the talks, Ho was not completely satisfied with Chou''''s proposed tactics.
Pentagon Papers cho thấy TC ép uổng VM phải theo ý mình trong hội nghị Geneva.
Pentagon Papers: Tq và Liên Sô cho phép Việt Minh cứng cựa yêu sách với Pháp đến một mức nào thôi. Mỗi khi đến tình trạng bế tắc là TC và LS nhảy vào buộc VM phải mềm dẻo xuống. Ngày 9/7/54, sau hội nghị Nanning, hai phó trưởng phái đoàn TC Li Knung và Chang Wen-tien nói riêng với trưởng phái đoàn Pháp Chauvel trong một bữa tiệc cơm tối là cứ yên chí đừng lo ngại gì cả vì Chu Ân Lai đã khuyên bảo được Hồ Chí Minh làm theo ý TC có lợi cho Pháp.
Momentarily leaving aside Chou's motivations, it is vital to note the impact of the talks on the Geneva negotiations. On July 9, Chauvel dined with Li Kenung and Chang Wen-tien, a vice-minister for foreign affairs and CPR ambassador to the Soviet Union. Chauvel opened the conversation--as he later recounted to Johnson--by complaining that discussions with the Viet Minh were not going well, that Viet Minh demands were exorbitant and well beyond Chou En-lai's stated position. The Chinese delegates evinced surprise but said nothing in direct reply. However, Chang did report that Chou had had a "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh, the results of which "would be helpful to French." Chauvel received the impression--one which seems, in retrospect, to have been accurate--that the Viet Minh had been given a free hand by the Soviets and Chinese up to the point where their demands were unacceptable to the French, at which time the Soviets and/or Chinese felt compelled to intervene. [Doc. 66] If such was the case, Chou's talk with Ho, coming after Mendès-France and his negotiators showed no sign of being more compromising than their predecessors, Laniel and Bidault, may have been intended to inform the Viet Minh that the "point" had been reached and that they had to soften their demands if a settlement were ever to be attained.
